Damascus, DZWatch – Leaked documents and recordings reveal that remnants of the Bashar al-Assad regime are transitioning from general reorganization to precise field management, dividing Syrian cities and regions, particularly along the coast, into armed districts operating as interconnected, independent units.
The documents indicate that this structure is not based on random movements but on a hierarchical organizational structure culminating at the district level. Small groups are tasked with carrying out missions within a framework designed to create a flexible and difficult-to-dismantle network.
According to the organizational chart within these networks, businessman Rami Makhlouf, a cousin of Bashar al-Assad, heads the so-called Supreme Defense Council, followed by former Special Forces commander Suheil al-Hassan, and then former Brigadier General Ghiath Dala, identified as a prominent field supervisor.
Beneath this top leadership, regions are divided into geographical sectors, each with a commander and officials responsible for recruitment, arming, and financing. These sectors are then further subdivided into smaller sections, ultimately reaching armed groups distributed across residential neighborhoods.
The documents suggest that this model has been implemented in several cities and towns, including Latakia, Tartus, Masyaf, Dreikish, Sheikh Badr, and Baniyas, as well as areas in Homs, Talkalakh, al-Suqaylabiyah, and the al-Ghab Plain.
The recordings reveal that former Brigadier General Ghiath Dala played a pivotal role in monitoring this field structure through constant communication with group leaders, seeking to know the number of fighters in each area and the amount of funding required to sustain operations.
Intelligence suggests that Dala resides in Lebanon under heightened security, frequently changing his location and phone numbers, relying on his son, a former officer, for transportation and managing some communication channels.
In one recording, Dala indicates that the number of fighters linked to his groups reached approximately 42,000 by April 2025, possessing anti-armor weapons, including Kornet and Konkurs missiles, in addition to heavy machine guns. The extent of this network poses a significant challenge to regional stability.
